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Secure Two-Way Communications via Intelligent Reflecting Surfaces
Lu Lv, Qingqing Wu, Zan Li, Naofal Al-Dhahir, and Jian Chen
Abstract—In this letter, we propose to exploit an intelligent
reflecting surface (IRS) to secure multiuser two-way communi-
cations. Specifically, two end users simultaneously transmit their
signals, where the signal of one user is exploited as information
jamming to disrupt the reception of the other user’s signal at an
eavesdropper. A simple user scheduling scheme is developed to
improve the secrecy rate. Analytical results in terms of a lower
bound on the average secrecy rate and its scaling laws are derived
to evaluate the secrecy performance and obtain valuable design
insights. Simulation results are provided to confirm the accuracy
of the theoretical analysis and validate the secrecy improvement
of the proposed scheme over two other baseline schemes.
Index Terms—Intelligent reflecting surface, physical-layer se-
curity, two-way communications, information jamming, average
secrecy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) is a promising physical-
layer technology to achieve energy and spectrally efficient
communications [1]. Technically, IRS is a planar surface that
consists of a large number of passive and low-cost recon-
figurable reflecting elements. Each element can be managed
to adjust its phase and/or amplitude for the incident signal
independently. This helps to create a smart and controllable
signal propagation environment for improving the spectrum
utilization [2], [3], radio coverage, and broadband connectivity
[4], [5] for sixth-generation (6G) wireless networks [6].
Thanks to its capability of reconfiguring wireless channels
in an efficient full-duplex manner, IRS has great potential to
enhance physical-layer security for wireless communications.
By intelligently designing the phase shifts of the IRS, signals
reflected by each reflecting element can be added construc-
tively at the legitimate receiver to enhance its reception quality,
while being received destructively at eavesdropper (Eve) to
degrade its signal reception. Hence, an improved secrecy rate
can be achieved. In [7], a secrecy rate maximization prob-
lem for an IRS assisted multiple-input single-output (MISO)
system was investigated, where artificial noise is used to jam
the Eve. In [8], an efficient alternating optimization algorithm
was proposed to maximize the secrecy rate of multiple-input
multiple-output transmission using IRS. In [9], the transmit
power subject to a secrecy rate constraint was minimized
for an IRS based MISO downlink system. Assuming that
Eve’s channel is unknown, a joint transmit beamforming
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and cooperative jamming strategy for IRS enhanced secrecy
transmission was developed in [10].
Based on the aforementioned works, we make the following
two observations:
• Existing studies on secrecy IRS [7]–[10] considered one-
way communications. However, exploiting an IRS to
enhance and secure two-way communications brings the
following two main advantages: 1) A higher secrecy
rate will be achieved, due to the improved spectral
efficiency. 2) Cooperative jamming can be implemented
cost-effectively without extra jamming injection. As Eve
receives signals from two end users at the same time,
and the signal of one user can be exploited as useful
jamming when Eve decodes the other user’s signal. To
our best knowledge, the research on this topic has not
been reported yet.
• Existing studies on secrecy IRS [7]–[10] considered
only the single user case, while a multiuser two-way
communications system has not been investigated yet.
Theoretically, a multiuser system can provide much
higher degrees of freedom for secrecy enhancement. For
instance, taking advantage of the multiuser diversity gain
by appropriate user scheduling, the secrecy rate can be
increased.
Motivated by the above observations, this letter investi-
gates the exploitation of an IRS to secure multiuser two-way
communications. In particular, two end users simultaneously
transmit their signals via an IRS, where the signal of one
user is used as a source of useful information jamming to
degrade the capability of Eve, while each user can remove the
interfering signal employing the self-interference cancellation
technique without impairing its reception quality. Design of the
user scheduling scheme is also studied to enhance the secrecy
rate. We derive a tight closed-form lower bound on the average
secrecy rate (ASR) for the optimal phase shifting at the IRS.
Then, asymptotic results of ASR scaling laws with sufficiently
large transmit power P , number of user pairs N , and number
of reflecting elements K of the IRS are provided to gain
useful design insights. Our analysis reveals that the proposed
IRS assisted multiuser two-way communications scheme can
guarantee perfect security for signal transmission, and the ASR
always benefits from increasing P , N , and K .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider an IRS assisted multiuser two-way communica-
tions system, which consists of N pairs of end users, i.e.,
denoted by {An,Bn} for n = 1, . . . , N , an IRS, and a passive
Eve. We assume no direct links between An and Bn, due to
blockages and/or deep fading, which motivates the deployment
of an IRS to establish communication links. Eve is assumed to
2be located within the communication range of the users and
IRS, such that it can overhear the confidential information
from both the direct channels of the users and the reflecting
channel of the IRS (i.e., the worst-case eavesdropping case).
The IRS has K low-cost reconfigurable reflecting elements,
and each element can reflect a phase shifted version of the
incident signal independently, to enhance the signal reception
quality at all users while reducing the information leakage to
Eve. A smart controller, which connects the IRS with the end
users, is in charge of the reflection elements reconfiguration
and assists the channel estimation of the IRS-involved links
[1].
All channels experience quasi-static block fading, i.e., the
fading channel coefficient of each wireless link remains a
constant in one fading block but changes independently across
different fading blocks. In a fading block, the channel vec-
tors between An/Bn and IRS are denoted by hn and gn,
respectively, the channel vector between the IRS and Eve is
denoted by he, and the fading gains between An/Bn and Eve
are denoted by hne and gne, respectively. We assume that the
system operates in a time-division duplexing (TDD) mode,
implying that channel reciprocity for user-to-IRS and IRS-to-
user channels holds. Each entry of hn, gn, and he, as well as
hne and gne are assumed to be independent complex Gaussian
distributed with zero mean and unit variance. The distances
from IRS to An, Bn, and Eve are denoted by dAn , dBn , and
de, and the distances from Eve to An and Bn are denoted by
dAne and dBne, respectively.
The transmit power budget for each user is P . The additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at each receiving user is
assumed to be complex Gaussian distributed with zero mean
and variance of σ20 . We further assume that the end users know
the instantaneous CSI of hn and gn, and the IRS knows the
channel phase values of hn and gn. However, the end users
only know the average CSI of hne and gne, due to the passive
nature of Eve. Furthermore, the distance information of all
links is available at the users and Eve.
As for the bidirectional information exchange, the two end
users both work in a full-duplex mode to perform simultaneous
transmission and reception. Assuming that An and Bn are
scheduled in the current transmission, then An and Bn transmit
the unit-power signals s1 and s2, respectively, and the IRS
reflects incident signals with a negligible delay. Thereby, the
received signal at An can be expressed as
yAn =
hTnΘgn√
dαAnd
α
Bn
√
Ps2 +
hTnΘhn
dαAn
√
Ps1 + lAn + nAn , (1)
where α denotes the path-loss exponent, Θ denotes the IRSs
diagonal phase-shift matrix and its K main diagonal elements
are the phase-shift values of the reflecting elements, lAn is the
residual loop-interference (RLI) after interference cancellation,
and nAn denotes the AWGN at An.
Since An knows hn, Θ, and dAn , it can completely cancel
its self-interference, i.e., the second term in (1). After that, An
decodes its desired signal with received signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) given by
γn1 =
P |hTnΘgn|2
dαAnd
α
Bn
(|lAn |2 + σ20)
. (2)
In this work, we adopt the RLI model according to [2], where
lAn is a random variable with zero mean and variance of σ
2
l ,
which has similar characteristics to the AWGN. Similarly, the
received SINR to decode s1 at Bn is obtained as
γn2 =
P |gTnΘhn|2
dαAnd
α
Bn
(|lBn |2 + σ20)
, (3)
where lBn is the RLI with zero mean and variance of σ
2
l .
The received signal at the Eve can be expressed as
ye =
(
hTe Θhn√
dαe d
α
An
+
hne√
dαAne
)√
Ps1
+
(
hTe Θgn√
dαe d
α
Bn
+
gne√
dαBne
)√
Ps2 + ne, (4)
where ne denotes the AWGN at Eve.
Based on (4), Eve tries to intercept both signals s1 and s2
using the successive interference cancellation technique [11],
[12]. Without loss of generality, we assume that Eve first
decodes s1 by treating s2 as noise (while the other case can
be treated similarly), yielding the received SINR as
γe1 =
P |ϕne|2
P |ψne|2 + σ20
, (5)
where we define ϕne = d
−α
2
e d
−α
2
An
hTe Θhn + d
−α
2
Ane
hne and
ψne = d
−α
2
e d
−α
2
Bn
hTe Θgn + d
−α
2
Bne
gne, respectively. If Eve can
correctly decode s1 (which means that γe1 ≥ γn1), then
it can remove s1 from its observations and decode s2 in
an interference-free manner. Otherwise, s1 can be viewed as
useful interference to decrease the received SINR of s2 without
any jamming signal injection. Therefore, the received SINR to
decode s2 can be obtained as follows
γe2 =


P |ψne|2
P |ϕne|2+σ20 , if γe1 < γn1,
P |ψne|2
σ2
0
, if γe1 ≥ γn1.
(6)
Since the instantaneous CSI of Eve is absent, we propose
a user scheduling scheme based on the instantaneous CSI
of legitimate channels. To guarantee user scheduling fairness
and improve the users’ achievable rates, the user pair can be
scheduled as follows
n∗ = arg max
n=1,...,N
|hTnΘgn|2. (7)
With the above results, the secrecy rates for s1 and s2 are
given, respectively, by
Rsi =
{
log(1 + γn∗i)− log(1 + γei)
}+
, (8)
where i ∈ {1, 2} and {·}+ = max{·, 0}.
Remark 1: The proposed IRS assisted multiuser two-way
communications scheme provide a new view on interference
exploitation. The signal from one specific user is exploited as
useful jamming to confuse Eve, as observed from (5) and (6).
This approach is cost-effective, since secrecy is guaranteed
not by constructing intentional interference that consumes
extra transmission power, but rather by reusing the signal that
already exists in two-way communications.
Remark 2: Due to channel reciprocity, we know from (2)
and (3) that γn1 and γn2 have the same expression, meaning
3that maximizing γn1 is equivalent to maximizing γn2. Thus,
the user scheduling criterion (7) can enhance the performance
of both users.
Remark 3: From (8), we observe that when P becomes
very large, γn∗1 goes to infinity while γe1 is upper bounded.
Thus, we always have γn∗1 > γe1, which indicates that perfect
security for signal transmission of s1 is achieved. Similarly,
we also obtain that perfect security for signal transmission of
s2 is guaranteed.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Optimal Phase Shift Design
To maximize the received SINRs at An and Bn, the phase
shifts at the IRS should be perfectly matched with the phases
of hn and gn, such that we have
ζn = |hTnΘgn|2 = |gTnΘhn|2 =
( K∑
k=1
|hnk||gnk|
)2
, (9)
where |hnk| and |gnk| are the amplitudes of the kth compo-
nents of hn and gn, respectively.
Lemma 1: The cumulative density function (CDF) of ζn is
approximately given by Fζn(x) ≃ 1Γ(Kµ)γ(Kµ,
√
x
ν
), where
µ = pi
2
16−pi2 , ν =
16−pi2
4pi , and γ(·, ·) and Γ(·) represent the
lower incomplete Gamma function and the Gamma function.
Proof: Using [2, Lemma 1], we know that the product
|hnk||gnk| can be approximated by a Gamma distribution with
parameters µ and ν. Then, a sum of K independent and
identically distributed Gamma random variables still follows a
Gamma distribution with parameters Kµ and ν. After simple
variable transformation, we prove the lemma.
B. Average Secrecy Rate
We adopt ASR as a metric to evaluate the secrecy perfor-
mance of IRS assisted secure multiuser two-way communica-
tions. In particular, the ASR is defined as the statistical average
of the secrecy rate over fading channels. With the help of
Jensen’s inequality (i.e., E[max{a, b}] ≥ max{E[a],E[b]}),
the ASR for signal si (i = 1, 2) can be lower bounded by
R¯si =
{
E
[
log(1 + γn∗i)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
QM,i
−E[ log(1 + γei)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
QE,i
}+
. (10)
The following theorem provides the lower bounds on the
closed-form ASRs for signals s1 and s2.
Theorem 1: The ASR lower bounds for s1 and s2 achieved
by the IRS assisted secure multiuser two-way communications
scheme can be approximated by
R¯s1 ≈
{ N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
ρn
√
1− θ2m sec2 xm
N(1 + ρn tanxm)
(
1− 1
ΓN (Kµ)
× γN
(
Kµ,
√
tanxm
ν
))
− σ
2
e
σ2e − σ2e′
(
e
1
ρ0σ
2
e′
× Ei
(
− 1
ρ0σ2e′
)
− e
1
ρ0σ
2
e Ei
(
− 1
ρ0σ2e
))}+
, (11)
R¯s2 ≈
{ N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
ρn
√
1− θ2m sec2 xm
N(1 + ρn tanxm)
(
1− 1
ΓN (Kµ)
× γN
(
Kµ,
√
tanxm
ν
))
− (J1 + J2)
}+
, (12)
where ρn =
P
dα
An
dα
Bn
(σ2
l
+σ2
0
)
, ρ0 =
P
σ2
0
, xm =
pi
4 (θm + 1),
θm = cos(
2m−1
2M pi),M is the the accuracy-complexity tradeoff
parameter of the Gauss-Chebyshev (G-C) quadrature [14], and
J1 and J2 are given in Appendix A.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 provides an efficient method to evaluate the
performance of IRS assisted secure multiuser two-way com-
munications, since it consists of power functions, Gamma
functions, trigonometric functions, which are easy to compute.
However, these expressions do not yield more intuitive insights
into the impacts of system parameters, such as the transmit
power P , the number of user pairs N , and the number of
reflecting elements K on the secrecy performance. Thus,
this motivates us to investigate the asymptotic performance
analysis in the following.
Corollary 1: For the proposed IRS assisted secure multiuser
two-way communication, we obtain: 1) R¯si ∝ logP , when N
andK are finite values but P →∞. 2) R¯si ∝ log logN , when
K and P are finite values but N →∞. 3) R¯si ∝ logK , when
N and P are finite values but K →∞.
Proof: In the large P regime, it is readily verified that
γn∗1 and γn∗2 increase with an increase in P , while γe1 and
γe1 approach a constant (since γe1 < γn∗1). Thus, an ASR
scaling law with P of logP is achieved for s1 and s2.
In the large N regime, using results in extreme theory,
it can be shown that γn∗1 and γn∗2 behave like P logN +
O(log logN). Applying [13, Theorem 4], we can obtain that
QM,1 and QM,2 scale as log logN . Moreover, both γe1 and
γe1 are independent of N when N is large. Thus, an ASR
scaling law with N of log logN is achieved for s1 and s2.
For a sufficiently large K , according to the central limit
theorem [4], we obtain that ζn in (9) converges to a Gaussian
random variable with mean equal to Kpi4 . By using the fact
that maxn=1,...,N ζn ≥ ζl, ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , N} and applying [13,
Theorem 4], it is shown that QM,1 and QM,2 scale as logK .
In the large K regime, hTe Θhn and h
T
e Θgn are approximated
as complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean, which
implies that γe1 and γe1 become independent of K . Thus, an
ASR scaling law with K of logK is achieved for s1 and s2.
Now, the corollary is proved.
Corollary 1 reveals an important design insight: Increasing
P , N , and K are helpful to the secrecy performance of IRS
assisted multiuser two-way communications, but the impact of
N is less than P and K since the growth with N is log log(·)
while it is log(·) for P and K . For instance, larger K helps to
achieve higher beamforming gain at the end users as well as
strong jamming strength at Eve, and larger N provides higher
multiuser diversity gain.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents numerical results to characterize the
performance of our proposed IRS assisted secure multiuser
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Fig. 3. Impact of N on the secrecy performance.
two-way communications scheme. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the IRS is located at (15, 0) meter (m),
Eve is located at (15, 20) m, An and Bn are uniformly
deployed inside a disc centered at (0, 0) m and (30, 0) m,
respectively, with radius equal to 5. We choose σ20 = −70
dBm, σ2l = −40 dBm, α = 4, andM = 20. The following two
baseline schemes are considered for performance comparison:
(1) IRS one-way with user-aided jamming, where bidirectional
information exchange is completed in two phases, and in each
phase one user transmits its data signal and the other user
transmits a jamming signal to confuse Eve. (2) IRS two-way
with random user scheduling, where the user pair is randomly
selected in each transmission block.
Fig. 1 shows the impact of transmit power P on the secrecy
performance with K = 32 and N = 10. The sum ASR is
defined as R¯s1 + R¯s2 . A general trend from Fig. 1 is that the
sum ASRs of all the schemes increase as P increases, and
the proposed scheme achieves the largest sum ASR. The IRS
assisted one-way communications with user-aided jamming
scheme achieves the worst secrecy performance. This is due
to the fact that it needs two phases to finish the bidirectional
information exchange, which is spectrally inefficient. It is
also observed that the ASR lower bound is very close to the
simulated results in the medium to high P regime, therefore,
confirming the accuracy of the derived analytical results in
Theorem 1.
Fig. 2 shows the sum ASR as a function of the number
of reflecting elements K with P = 20 dBm and N = 6.
Similarly, it is observed from this figure that the sum ASR
is an increasing function of K for all the schemes, due to
the fact that more reflecting elements in the IRS provide
a stronger cascaded channel for legitimate reception quality
improvement. In particular, the proposed IRS assisted secure
multiuser two-way communications scheme yields the best
secrecy performance. Moreover, its sum ASR has the same
increasing slope as the reference curve, which indicates that
a sum ASR scaling law of 2 logK is achieved, thus verifying
the results in Corollary 1.
Fig. 3 illustrates the sum ASR versus the number of user
pairs N with P = 20 dBm and K = 32. From Fig. 3,
we observe that our proposed scheme outperforms the two
baseline schemes and its sum ASR increases with the increase
in N . However, the sum ASR of the IRS two-way with random
user scheduling is independent of N , since it fails to exploit
the degree of freedom offered by the multiuser system.
V. CONCLUSION
This letter proposed IRS assisted secure multiuser two-way
communications. Analytical expressions of a lower bound on
the ASR and its scaling laws were derived in closed form to
evaluate the secrecy performance and gain valuable insights.
Both analytical and simulated results showed that the proposed
scheme achieve perfect security and its ASR of each signal
scales as logP , logK , and log logN , respectively, in the
asymptotic regime.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
By applying Lemma 1 and the user scheduling criterion in
(7), we can easily obtain the CDF of ζn∗1 as
Fζn∗1(x) =
1
ΓN (Kµ)
γN
(
Kµ,
√
x
ν
)
. (13)
Using this result and the G-C quadrature,QM,1 can be approx-
imated by
QM,1 =
N∑
n=1
Pr
(
n∗ = n
)
ρn
∫ ∞
0
1− Fγn∗1(x)
1 + ρnx
dx
≈
N∑
n=1
M∑
m=1
ρn
√
1− θ2m sec2 xm
N(1 + ρn tanxm)
×
(
1− 1
ΓN (Kµ)
γN
(
Kµ,
√
tanxm
ν
))
, (14)
where we use the change of variable x = tan y and the fact
that Pr(n∗ = n) = 1
N
.
Furthermore, before deriving QE,1, we need to first deter-
mine the CDFs of |ϕn∗e|2 and |ψn∗e|2. However, it is in
general difficult to derive closed-form expressions for hTe Θhn
and hTe Θgn, since they are sums of complex-valued random
variables, for which the real and imaginary parts are correlated.
Thanks to [4, Lemma 2], for a large K , we can approximate
them as complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean
and unit variance. Based on this result, we can obtain that
ϕne and ψne follow a complex Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and variances of σ2e = d
−α
2
e d
−α
2
An
+ d
−α
2
Ane
and
5QE,2 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
(∫ ∞
y
x+ 1
ρ0
log
(
1 +
x
y + 1
ρ0
)
dFγn∗1(z) +
∫ y
x+ 1
ρ0
0
log
(
1 + ρ0x
)
dFγn∗1(z)
)
f|ψn∗e|2(x)f|ϕn∗e|2(y)dxdy
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 +
x
y + 1
ρ0
)e− xσ2e′ − yσ2e
σ2eσ
2
e′
dxdy︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
log
( 1 + ρ0y
1 + y
x+ 1
ρ0
)
Fγn∗1
( y
x+ 1
ρ0
)e− xσ2e′ − yσ2e
σ2eσ
2
e′
dxdy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
. (15)
σ2e′ = d
−α
2
e d
−α
2
Bn
+d
−α
2
Bne
, respectively. Thus, the CDF of |ϕn∗e|2
can be derived as
F|ϕn∗e|2(x) =
N∑
n=1
Pr
(
n∗ = n
)(
1− e−
x
σ2e
)
= 1− e−
x
σ2e . (16)
Similarly, the CDF of |ψn∗e|2 is given by
F|ψn∗e|2(x) = 1− e
− x
σ2
e′ . (17)
Based on (16)–(17), the CDF of γe1 is obtained as
Fγe1(x) = 1−
σ2e
σ2e + σ
2
e′x
e
− x
ρ0σ
2
e . (18)
Using this result and [15, eq. (3.352.4)], QE,1 is derived as
QE,1 =
σ2e
σ2e′
∫ ∞
0
e
− x
ρ0σ
2
e
(1 + x)(σ20/σ
2
e′ + x)
dx
=
σ2e
σ2e − σ2e′
(
e
1
ρ0σ
2
e′ Ei
(
− 1
ρ0σ2e′
)
− e
1
ρ0σ
2
e Ei
(
− 1
ρ0σ2e
))
. (19)
Combining (14) with (19), a closed-form expression for R¯s1
is obtained.
On the other hand, since γn∗1 and γn∗2 are symmetric, the
CDF of γn∗2 is the same as (13), and thus, QM,2 is the same
as (14). In addition, we can compute QE,2 using (15), shown
at the top of the page, where J1 is approximated using the
G-C quadrature by
J1 ≈ −pi
2e
− 1
ρ0σ
2
e′
4Mσ2e
M∑
m=1
√
1− θ2me
− tan xm
σ2
e′
− tan xm
σ2e
× Ei
(
− tanxm + 1/ρ0
σ2e
)
sec2 xm. (20)
To calculate J2, we first define α =
y
x+ 1
ρ0
and β = ρ0y, then
the Jacobian matrix is
P =
[
dx
dα
dx
dβ
dy
dα
dy
dβ
]
=
[
− β
ρ0α2
1
ρ0α
0 1
ρ0
]
, (21)
such that we have |P| = − β
ρ2
0
α2
. Based on this, J2 can be
approximated using [15, eq. (3.351.3) and (4.337.5)] and the
G-C quadrature by
J2 =
e
− 1
ρ0σ
2
e′
ρ20σ
2
eσ
2
e′
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
log
(1 + β
1 + α
)βFγn∗1(α)
α2
e−τ(α)βdαdβ
=
e
− 1
ρ0σ
2
e′
ρ20σ
2
eσ
2
e′
∫ ∞
0
∆(α)Fγn∗1(α)
α2τ2(α)
dα
≈ pi
2e
− 1
ρ0σ
2
e′
4Mρ20σ
2
eσ
2
e′
M∑
m=1
√
1− θ2m∆(tanxm)
× Fγn∗1(tanxm)
τ2(tanxm)
csc2 xm, (22)
where ∆(α) =
(
1
τ(α) − 1
)
eτ(α)Ei(−τ(α)) − log(1 + α) + 1
and τ(α) = 1
ρ0σ
2
e′
α
+ 1
ρ0σ2e
. Combining (14), (20), and (22),
a closed-form expression for R¯s2 is derived, which completes
the proof of Theorem 1.
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